The spectre of armed conflict looms over Colombia’s presidential election as voters head to the polls this weekend. The campaign, one of the most polarised in recent memory, has been dominated by debates over how to address the country's six-decade-long internal war. With peace accords, drug violence, and rural inequality at stake, the outcome will determine whether Colombia continues its fragile path toward reconciliation or returns to full-scale confrontation.
Colombia’s conflict, which has killed over 260,000 people and displaced millions, is a complex web of state forces, leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, and drug cartels. The 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) promised to end the longest-running war in the Americas. But implementation has been slow, and violence persists. According to the Colombian government’s Victims Unit, more than 100,000 civilians have been killed or injured since 2017. In 2023 alone, 85 massacres were recorded, a slight decrease from previous years but still a sobering reality.
Two candidates embody the stark choice facing Colombians. On the right is Rodolfo Hernández, a former mayor of Bucaramanga and a political outsider who has called for a “firm hand” against rebel groups. He has proposed renegotiating the peace accord and increasing military spending. On the left, Gustavo Petro, a former M-19 guerrilla turned senator, has pledged to fully implement the deal and redirect funds from the military to rural development. Both men have been accused of corruption, but they are united in their rejection of the political establishment.
A recent survey by Invamer shows Hernández with a narrow lead of 41% to Petro’s 38%, but with 21% undecided, the race is too close to call. The margin of error is plus or minus 3%. The election is expected to be the most violent in decades. In the first round on July 24, 43 polling places were attacked by armed groups, and the government sent troops to 300 precincts. The Organisation of American States has reported threats against 90 candidates, and at least 15 have been killed since 2020.
The violence is not random. It is strategic. Armed groups seek to influence the vote in areas where they hold control. In the department of Cauca, for example, a stronghold of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident FARC factions, voting is heavily restricted. These groups profit from illegal mining and drug trafficking, and they fear that a Petro government would crack down on their finances. Hernández, conversely, has promised to wage an all-out war, which some analysts say would only escalate the conflict.
The international community is watching closely. The United Nations has emphasised that the election must be free and fair. But with violence limiting turnout and fears of fraud, legitimacy is at risk. If Hernández wins, he may struggle to govern a country deeply divided by region, class, and ideology. If Petro wins, he will face a hostile congress and a military that is wary of its former enemy.
Colombia’s conflict is often described as a “mutually hurting stalemate,” a term from peace studies that means both sides are exhausted and the cost of continuing is higher than the cost of peace. Yet the election shows that the stalemate is not yet resolved. The country’s future hinges on which candidate can transform that pain into a sustainable peace.
As the British philosopher John Gray once noted, “conflicts are not resolved when they are finally settled but when they are believed to be settled.” For Colombia, the belief in a peaceful settlement remains fragile. The result of this election will either strengthen that belief or shatter it, with consequences that will echo across the Americas.