The 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is at a critical juncture as renewed tensions between Tehran and Washington collide with a deepening political crisis in Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long opposed the agreement, now confronts a fragile coalition and mounting corruption charges, limiting his ability to shape regional policy.
The JCPOA, negotiated under the Obama administration, aimed to curb Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. President Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018, reimposing crippling sanctions and pursuing a strategy of maximum pressure. Iran responded by gradually breaching enrichment limits, stockpiling low-enriched uranium, and installing advanced centrifuges. Today, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile exceeds JCPOA limits by more than 20 times. Enrichment levels have reached 60%, dangerously close to weapons-grade threshold of 90%.
The Biden administration has sought to revive the deal through indirect talks in Vienna, but negotiations have stalled since March 2022. Iran’s insistence on delisting its Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organisation and guarantees that future US administrations will not withdraw again remain key sticking points. Meanwhile, Iran’s nuclear advances have eroded the deal’s original non-proliferation benefits. The breakout time, the period needed to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, has shrunk from one year to a matter of weeks.
For Mr Netanyahu, the nuclear issue is existential. He has consistently argued that the JCPOA legitimises Iran’s enrichment programme and provides it with financial resources to support proxies across the region. His government has conducted a covert campaign of sabotage and assassinations against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including the recent killing of a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officer in Tehran. Yet Mr Netanyahu’s political position is precarious. His coalition, one of the most right-wing in Israel’s history, faces internal dissent over judicial overhaul plans and budget disputes. A corruption trial is ongoing, and public support is waning. These domestic distractions limit his ability to command a unified security posture or to push for a more assertive US approach.
The risk of miscalculation is high. Iran may feel emboldened to accelerate its nuclear programme, believing that Israel and the US are constrained by internal politics. Conversely, a frustrated Mr Netanyahu might order a military strike on Iranian facilities, escalating into a wider conflict with Hezbollah and other proxies. The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have grown increasingly nervous. They seek US security guarantees and have pursued their own diplomacy with Iran, wary of being drawn into another war.
The United States faces a strategic dilemma. A return to the JCPOA would likely require concessions that appear to reward Iranian blackmail. Prolonging the status quo allows Iran to creep closer to a weapon. Any military action risks a regional conflagration at a time when the US is focused on Russia-Ukraine and competition with China. For now, the Biden administration continues to assess the viability of diplomacy, but with Mr Netanyahu’s political crisis deepening, the window for a negotiated settlement may be closing. The broader Middle East order, already fractured by decades of conflict, now hangs in the balance.
