A co-ordinated assault on Niger’s primary international airport has left 35 dead and forced the emergency evacuation of British military advisors, marking a significant escalation in the Sahel’s ongoing security crisis. The attack, which occurred during the pre-dawn hours, involved multiple gunmen using small arms and rocket-propelled grenades to breach perimeter defences at the Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey. This was not a random act of violence. It was a calculated strike against a critical node in Western logistical networks, aimed at degrading NATO’s ability to project power in the region.

From a threat vector perspective, the targeting of an airport is highly deliberate. Airfields represent the single most important point of entry for personnel, equipment, and humanitarian aid. By disrupting operations at Niamey, the attackers have effectively severed a key artery for French, American, and British counter-terrorism missions across the Sahel. The fact that British advisors were on site and required immediate extraction indicates that intelligence assessments had failed to anticipate the scale of the threat. This is a strategic intelligence failure of the first order.

The operational tempo suggests a high degree of planning and external support. The attackers used coordinated fire and movement, neutralised security checkpoints, and targeted aircraft parked on the tarmac. Initial reports indicate that at least two civilian airliners were damaged, with one completely destroyed. This bears the hallmarks of a hybrid warfare approach: a combination of insurgent tactics and conventional military precision. The group responsible has not yet claimed credit, but the modus operandi points to a nexus of jihadist factions operating under the banner of JNIM or ISGS.

For the United Kingdom, the evacuation of military advisors is a public admission of strategic vulnerability. The so-called ‘train and assist’ model, which has been the cornerstone of British engagement in the Sahel, is now shown to be untenable without robust force protection. The withdrawal will have a chilling effect on partner forces, who rely on Western technical expertise and air support. This is a reputational blow that will be exploited by hostile actors to frame the West as a declining power.

From a hardware and logistics standpoint, the attack raises serious questions about airbase defence in asymmetric environments. Perimeter security, stand-off detection, and rapid reaction capability have all been found wanting. The British Ministry of Defence must now conduct an urgent review of force protection protocols across all forward operating bases in the region. This includes reassessing the reliance on local security forces, who may be penetrated or compromised, and the need for organic counter-drone and counter-mortar systems.

More broadly, this incident signals a strategic pivot. Hostile state actors such as Russia and Iran are actively exploiting instability in the Sahel to expand their influence, often through the Wagner Group and other proxies. The attack on Niamey airport serves their interests by accelerating Western withdrawal and creating a power vacuum. We should expect further direct attacks on civilian infrastructure as part of a concerted campaign to make the cost of Western presence prohibitive.

The immediate tactical response will involve reinforcing remaining airfields with additional quick reaction forces and establishing no-fly zones. But the strategic fix requires a fundamental reassessment of the UK’s posture in West Africa. We cannot continue to operate in permissive environments that no longer exist. If the political will to commit boots on the ground is absent, then we must invest in over-the-horizon capabilities, strike drones, and intelligence fusion centres that can disrupt threats before they reach the perimeter fence.

This is a wake-up call. The enemy has learned to target our logistical tail. If we do not adapt, the next attack will not just kill 35 people