If one were to flick through the history books of the 20th century, they would find that the Soviet Union and China were never natural bedfellows. Their marriage of convenience, much like the current Russia-China partnership, was always a tangle of suspicion and opportunism. Today, as the world watches the axis of autocrats tighten, we must ask: how long before the cracks become chasms?
Consider the fundamental incompatibility of their ambitions. Russia, a declining petro-state with a shrinking population and an economy that resembles a Potemkin village, seeks to reclaim its status as a great power through military bluster and gas pipelines. China, by contrast, is an aspiring global hegemon with a methodical, long-term strategy of economic and technological domination. President Xi Jinping fancies himself the architect of a new Sinocentric world order, while President Putin clings to the nostalgic fantasy of a Russian sphere of influence.
These divergent visions are not merely academic. They clash in Central Asia, where both nations vie for influence over the ‘Stans. They clash in the Arctic, where China’s Polar Silk Road rubs against Russia’s determination to maintain exclusive control over the Northern Sea Route. And they clash in the Middle East, where Russia sells S-400 systems to India while China arms Pakistan with fighter jets.
The recent meeting in Beijing between Xi and Putin was a masterclass in diplomatic theatre. The two leaders smiled, shook hands, and signed a litany of agreements. But read the fine print. Russia’s dependence on China as a buyer of its oil and gas has turned Yanbian into the senior partner. Every barrel sold at a discount is another nail in the coffin of Russian economic sovereignty. Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative snakes through Kazakhstan, undermining Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.
The rhetoric of a New Era Strategic Partnership is just that: rhetoric. Underneath the pageantry, both powers are engaged in a cold war of manoeuvre. Russia fears being reduced to a Chinese vassal state, a gas station with nuclear weapons. China worries that its association with a pariah nation tarnishes its own image as a responsible global stakeholder, especially as it seeks to woo European investors and neutralise American hawkishness.
History does not repeat, but it rhymes. The Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s was triggered by ideological differences and national pride. Today, the ideological canvas has been painted over with transactional exchanges. But pride remains. Putin cannot stomach being the junior partner. Xi cannot tolerate anyone blocking his path to primacy.
The West would be foolish to assume this alliance will hold. The best geopolitical strategy is not to confront this pair head-on but to exploit their rivalry. Incentivise Russian energy exports to Europe through clever sanctions loopholes. Offer China a seat at the table for global trade governance in exchange for a more independent line. Let them feel the gravitational pull of their own self-interest.
For now, the fragile alliance persists because both leaders need it. Putin needs Xi’s capital to survive the war in Ukraine. Xi needs Putin’s alignment to distract from his own domestic and international troubles. But alliances born of desperation rarely endure. Watch for the tell-tale signs: a Russian pipeline deal that Beijing refuses to finance, a Chinese veto in the UN Security Council that Moscow ignores, or a skirmish along the Sino-Russian border that both sides downplay.
The marriage of convenience is heading for a messy divorce. And when it happens, the world will be left to pick up the pieces of a reordered international system. The only question is who will file first.
